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I. INTRODUCTION
The scene played out in Mr. Smith Goes to Washington' of the
independent and moral-grounded Senator using the filibuster as his "line in
the sand" against corruption is a romantic vision. The reality is that there is
a darker side to the practice rooted in partisan motives and a disrespect for
the rule of law.
It is well established that the founding fathers sought to avoid a "rule by
mob" approach to government.2 However, is it reasonable to conclude that
they wished for a government that was ruled by a discontented minority?
1. MR. SMITH GOES TO WASHINGTON (Columbia/Tristar Studios 1939).
2. See Jolanta Juszkiewicz, Listen, the Public Is Speaking Out on Crime, 61 FED. PROBATION,
Sept. 1997, at 82 (noting that "[w]hile expounding the virtues of 'one man one vote' the Founding
Fathers feared unbridled rule by the masses (translated as mob rule, or rule by unrestrained,
uninformed, perhaps even uneducated, majorities)"). After the revolution the Founding Fathers
discovered that the people were just "as capable of despotism as any prince .. " GORDON S.
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-1787, 410 (1969); see also Christopher
L. Mass, Proposition 103: Too Good to Be True, 12 WHITTIER L. REV. 403, 432 (1991) ("The
Founding Fathers were cognizant of the detrimental effects of 'mob rule' or direct democracy when
they formulated our system of representative government. In other words, the inherent danger with
direct democracy or legislation passed by initiative is 'tyranny of the majority."'); Daniel Mark
Cohen, Begging the Court's Pardon: Justice Denied for the Poorest of the Poor, 14 ST. THOMAS L.
REv. 825, 845 (2002).
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That is arguably what is happening today in the United States of America's
Senate.
Today, a minority of Senators have engaged in questionably
unprecedented filibusters to obstruct the confirmations of President Bush's
judicial nominees, thereby preventing the Senate as a whole from voting on
his nominations. The national arena is the stage for this backbiting,
illustrated with the recent headlines of an all-night Senate session staged by
Republicans as a demonstration against the filibuster over three of the
President's nominations: California Supreme Court Justice Janice Rogers
Brown, Texas Supreme Court Justice Priscilla Owen, and California Judge
Carolyn Kuhl.3 Another recent filibustered nominee was Miguel Estrada,
who in September 2004 asked the President to withdraw him from
consideration after his nomination went through seven unsuccessful cloture
votes.4
In addition, it is important to note that while a record number of
President Bush's nominees have been successfully confirmed, there is
nonetheless a constitutional problem. For example, if one person's civil
rights were not honored, one could not legitimately counter by arguing that
hundreds of others' civil rights were not violated - that one person was still
harmed. The vast majority of our constitutional law has been developed one
case at a time. Thus, by disregarding the constitution, even in a "small
amount," we weaken the document as a whole.
It is the intent of this article to specially discuss the constitutionally of
filibustering judicial nominations - not the filibuster itself. Part II will
3. Tom Curry, Senate Pulls Al-Nighter on Nominees, MSNBC, available at http://msnbc.msn.
comiid/3475120/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2005). Janet Hook, a Los Angeles Times staff writer
commented on the thirty-hour talk marathon:
Beginning this evening, Senate Republicans plan to invoke the spirit of that tradition by
forcing Democrats to talk through the night to sustain their filibuster of several
controversial judicial nominations.
But no one expects the staged 30-hour talkathon to break the yearlong deadlock over
judges, and Republicans admit the event is more a public relations effort to spotlight an
obscure issue than a realistic drive to break the opposition.
The fanfare that has gone into holding the Senate in an all-night session, the outcome of
which is preordained, underscores just how marginal the old-style filibuster has become.
Long gone are the days when the filibuster was deployed mostly for issues of great
national significance such as civil rights and war, with senators holding the floor by
reciting recipes, reading from the Bible and devising ways to avoid trips to the bathroom.
Janet Hook, The Nation; Long-Winded Senate Tradition; The GOP Plans to Force a Filibuster
Today, But the All-Night Talkathon Lost Its Relevance Years Ago, Los ANGELES TIMES, Nov. 12,
2003, at A 18.
4. Robert S. Greenberger, Despite Estrada's Wishes, Race Is an Issue, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7,
2003, at A4; Neil A. Lewis, Stymied by Democrats in Senate, Bush Court Pick Finally Gives Up,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2003, at Al; Gerald Walpin, Take Obstructionism Out of the Judicial
Nominations Confirmations Process, 8 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 89, 101 (2003) (stating that "[tihe
filibuster succeeded when on September 4, 2003, Estrada asked the President to withdraw his
nomination-thus making him the first nominee for a court of appeals defeated by the filibuster
weapon").
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explore the historical aspects of filibustering in America and discuss how the
practice has mutated into its current state. In addition, this section will
briefly discuss the history of the judicial nomination system, including the
American Bar Association's involvement in the matter. Part III will address
the constitutionality of filibustering judicial nominees, in addition to the
impact of the advice and consent clause and the notion of separation of
powers. This section goes on to discuss the wording of the constitution itself
and how it sheds lights on this debate. Lastly, it is argued that the structure
of the Senate Rules may be unconstitutional due to the imposition of those
Rules on new Senates. Part IV will briefly describe the political dimension
to this entire debate and how both sides of the aisle are mudding the waters
instead of seeing the situation for what it really is - a constitutional crisis.
Lastly, Part V will address the constitutional impact of this issue and suggest
potential remedies.
II. HISTORY OF THE FILIBUSTER
The term "filibuster" means prolonged speaking that obstructs the
progress of legislative action by the "use of obstructionist tactics."5 It dates
back to early Dutch, but did not become prolifically used until the French
used the word flibustier to describe pirates who pillaged the Spanish
colonies in the West Indies.6  The history of the filibuster in American
politics is a bit more complicated.
A. The Filibuster in America
As is often done in a debate over constitutional jurisprudence, the
history of the subject must be conversed to set the backdrop for the
discussion. One could not write a legal article pertaining to the art of
filibustering without discussing the 1997 article written by Erwin
Chemerinsky and Catherine Fisk titled The Filibuster, where the authors
wrote:
Depending on one's perspective, the filibuster appears to be either a
pillar of the Senate's venerable tradition of unlimited debate and a
bulwark against tyranny of the majority, or evidence of the rise of
partisanship and the decline of principle, reason, and collegiality in
the Senate. Both of these accounts tend to suffer from the sorts of
problems often associated with the instrumental use of history:
Senate "tradition" in this context is often more normative than
5. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 518 (4th ed. 2002). The word is also used
to describe an "irregular military adventurer" or "an American engaged in fomenting insurrections in
Latin America in the mid-19th century" or anybody trying to carry out insurrectionist activities in
any foreign country. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 468 (11 th ed. 2003).
6. The word filibuster was greatly influenced by the Spanish wordfilibustero which ultimately,
is believed, to come from the Dutch word freebooter. COMPACT OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 522
(2d ed. 1991).
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descriptive; that is, it is less about the way things were than about
the way they were supposed to have been.7
In addition, the authors concluded that the filibuster of 2004 is not the
same as the filibuster of 1794.8 The "event" has moved from a practice,
rooted in tradition and some rational sense of unlimited debate, to an
institution of a political quagmire. 9 The 2004 filibuster dominates over its
earlier employment, in that it gives a minority group of senators more power
in a legislative veto with less accountability.'°
1. The Birth of the American Filibuster
The notion of a strategic use of debate dates back to the very notion of a
senate in Rome." In the United States, the first recorded instance of
"tactical debate" occurred in 1790, "when senators from Virginia and South
Carolina filibustered to prevent the location of the first Congress in
Philadelphia."1 2 There, the motion had come to a vote and the House of
Representatives turned it down.' 3 The vote was so close the second time that
"an ailing senator had to be carried into the Senate on his bed to cast the
swing vote."' 4 On a day that the ill senator could not be carried in, the
members in favor of the Philadelphia site tried to bring the issue to a vote,
but the senators of the South, preferring a Capitol closer to home, made
lethargic motions which prevented the vote.' 5
The term "filibuster" started to be used to describe dilatory motions and
speeches in the mid 1800s. 16 At first, both the House of Representatives and
the Senate could and would use the filibuster technique.' 7 However, as the
House grew in size, it became necessary to revise House rules to limit
debate.'8 Limited at 100 members, the Senate did not feel the need to do the
7. Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 185 (1997).
The Filibuster proved extremely useful in writing this article and provided much of the historical
research in this article.
8. See id.
9. Id. at 186.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 187 (citing ROBERT LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE: PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICES
AND THE COURSE OF BUSINESS IN THE FRAMING OF STATUTES 277-78 (1922)).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 187-88.
15. Id. at 188.
16. U.S. Senate, Filibuster and Cloture, available at http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/
history/common/briefing/FilibusterCloture.htm (last visited June 22, 2004) [hereinafter U.S.
Senate].
17. Id.
18. Id.
same.' 9  In 1856, the Senate officially established a right to unlimited
debate. 20 By the mid-1860s, filibustering had become a phenomenon rather
than a sporadic escapade.2'
Despite the rise in the practice, most filibusters were unsuccessful in
preventing a measure to a vote. 2 Indeed, "almost every filibustered measure
before 1880 was eventually passed., 23  It was not until 1880 that Senators
started to use the filibuster more frequently and with much more potency.24
"By the time the cloture rule was adopted in 1917, senators and the public
alike perceived filibustering to be a serious problem."25
2. Filibuster v. Cloture
In 1841, a small Democratic minority attempted to block a bank bill
promoted by Henry Clay. 6 As a result of this maneuver, Clay threatened to
lobby for a change to the rules that would allow the majority of the Senate to
19. Id.
20. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 190.
21. See id. at 193. Professors Chemerinsky and Fisk point out that there is a problem of
identifying and counting filibusters:
The difficulty stems from the ambivalence senators have always had about them. On the
one hand, senators have from the beginning derided filibusters as obstructive, an affront
to the Senate colleagues-and perhaps to the House and the President-who support
legislation. Filibusters waste time and create inconvenience and conflict in a body that
values collegiality. On the other hand, filibusters can be a courageous way of taking a
stand, which can be popular with constituents and can even gain grudging respect from
colleagues. Not surprisingly, therefore, senators have often been reluctant to
acknowledge filibustering when it occurred, and conversely, have used the threat of the
filibusters to achieve policy goals without intending to actually filibuster.
Id. at 194.
22. Id. at 195.
23. Id.
24. Id.; see also Adam D. Glassman, The Imposition of Federal Caps in Medical Malpractice
Liability Actions: Will They Cure the Current Crisis in Health Care?, 37 AKRON L. REv. 417
(2004).
25. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 195. As Professors Fisk & Chemerinsky note:
One of the most notorious filibusters was Progressive Senator Robert M. LaFollette's
1908 filibuster of a currency bill that he believed was a power grab by the rich. This
filibuster set records for length, sophistication of procedural combat, and treachery, and
contributed significantly to the Senate's sense that something needed to be done to limit
debate. During his eighteen hours holding the floor in the stifling heat of the Senate
chamber, including an all-night speech made necessary by a parliamentary ruling that
prohibited him from using quorum calls to get a moment's rest, LaFollette sustained
himself with turkey sandwiches and eggnog from the Senate restaurant. After taking a
large swallow from a particular glass of eggnog, he rejected it as adulterated. And indeed
it was; the glass was laced with enough ptomaine to kill him. The ptomaine he had
swallowed made him quite ill, but he managed by forcing roll calls to escape for a few
minutes of respite, and he continued his speech for another eight hours. The filibuster was
ultimately lost when Senator Gore, who was blind, yielded the floor as prearranged to a
colleague, who, unbeknownst to Gore, had just stepped out to the cloakroom.
Id. at 196.
26. U.S. Senate, supra note 16.
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close debate.27 'Thomas Hart Benton angrily rebuked his colleague,
accusing Clay of trying to stifle the Senate's right to unlimited debate. 28
The unlimited debate doctrine continued to be the rule of the Senate
until 1917.29 It was at that time, at the suggestion of President Woodrow
Wilson, that the Senate adopted Rule XXII, which allowed the Senate to end
a debate with a two-thirds majority vote, a technique known as "cloture. 3 °
The push for this new rule was a result of a filibuster of the President's bill
to arm merchant ships to defend themselves from German U-boats during
World War I. On March 4, 1917, after the bill was blocked, the President
made a speech that was published in The New York Times stating that the
filibuster was:
[A] situation unparalleled in the history of the country, perhaps
unparalleled in the history of any modern Government. In the
immediate presence of a crisis fraught with more subtle and far-
reaching possibilities of national danger than any other the
Government has known within the whole history of its international
relations, the Congress has been unable to act either to safeguard the
country or to vindicate the elementary rights of its citizens. More
than 500 of the 531 members of the two houses were ready and
anxious to act; the House of Representatives had acted, by an
overwhelming majority; but the Senate was unable to act because a
little group of eleven Senators had determined that it should not....
The Senate of the United States is the only legislative body in the
world which cannot act when its majority is ready for action. A
little group of willful men, representing no opinion but their own,
have rendered the great Government of the United States helpless
and contemptible.
The remedy? There is but one remedy. The only remedy is that the
rules of the Senate shall be so altered that it can act. The country
can be relied upon to draw the moral. I believe that the Senate can
be relied on to supply the means of action and save the country from
disaster.3'
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 41 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 318-20 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1983); see also Virginia
A. Seitz & Joseph R. Guerra, A Constitutional Defense of "Entrenched" Senate Rules Governing
Debate, 20 J.L. & POL. 1, 10 (2004). There were numerous attempts during the second half of the
19th century and in the first few years of the 20th century to amend the rules and allow debate to end
with a vote. Seitz & Guerra, supra, at 10. However, although the proposals were frequent, they
were defeated just as frequently. Id. "It was ultimately a crisis occasioned by the First World War
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Rule XXII was put to the test in 1919, when the Senate invoked cloture
to end a filibuster against the Treaty of Versailles.32 However, despite the
new cloture rule, filibusters continued to be a successful means to block
legislation.33 In fact, for almost fifty years after Rule XXII was enacted it
"served a purpose more symbolic than real. Between 1917 and 1927, cloture
was voted on only ten times and it was adopted only four times. 34 From the
1930s to 1960s it became even more seldom to see the cloture rule evoked.35
This had much to do with the fight brewing in Washington over the civil
right movement.
36
3. The Filibuster Reaches Adulthood
The "great" filibuster against the Civil Rights Act in 1964 is unrivaled
in duration and infamy. Senators, mostly from the Southern states, were
resolute to resist a federal law that would undermine a tradition of
segregation. 37  The resistance lasted eighty-two days and took up 63,000
pages in the Congressional Record.38
The "coalition of Southern senators enjoyed extraordinary power in the
Senate, as a result of... seniority that came from serving in safe seats
representing one-party states and the use of the filibuster[s] to block civil
rights legislation. The Senate did not vote cloture once between 1927 and
1962." 39 The civil rights filibusters
sparked controversy unequaled since 1917. Beginning during
Reconstruction and continuing for nearly a century, anti-civil rights
filibusters played a major role in blocking measures to prohibit
lynching, poll taxes, and race discrimination in employment,
housing, public accommodations, and voting. Although the
filibuster was not solely responsible for the delay of civil rights
legislation-some responsibility must attach to Franklin
Roosevelt's reluctance to alienate the powerful Southerners whose
that brought about the first cloture rule in the Senate. In 1917, the so-called Armed Ship Bill, sought
by President Woodrow Wilson to arm American merchant vessels against German submarine
attacks, was defeated by a Senate filibuster." Id.; see Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 197.
32. U.S. Senate, supra note 16.
33. Id.
34. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 198.
35. Id.; U.S. Senate, supra note 16.
36. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 199; U.S. Senate, supra note 16.
37. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination
Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 492 (2000). Contra Robert A. Burt,
Constitutional Law and the Teaching of the Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455, 485 (1984) (stating that
"[i]n political terms, Southern defenders of the segregation regime had been dramatically isolated
and even shamed by the unprecedented amassing of two-thirds of the Senate to override filibusters
against the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, 1965, and 1968"). In fact, when cloture was first voted on in
1964, there were only seven non-Southern Senators who voted against cloture: Goldwater and
Hayden of Arizona, Young of North Dakota, Bible of Nevada, Mechem of New Mexico, Byrd of
West Virginia, and Simpson of Wyoming. Id. at 485 n.97 (citing 110 CONG. REc. 13,327 (1967)).
38. Post & Siegel, supra note 37, at 492.
39. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 199.
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support was crucial for the New Deal to survive-the filibuster was
indispensable in the Southerners' fight.
40
"The 1970s mark the beginning of the modern era of filibustering and a
dramatic change in the nature of its practice.' Particularly, in 1975, the
Senate reduced the amount of Senators needed for a cloture vote from two-
thirds to three-fifths.42 This had a considerable impact considering a new
trend of conservatives beginning to vote for cloture.43
The most significant change to the filibuster came from the
implementation of the two-track debate system on the Senate floor. The
then Senate Majority Leader, Mike Mansfield, developed a system where the
morning would be dedicated to filibustered legislation and the afternoon to
other legislation." This new rule actually helped filibustering by reducing
the amount of time the minority senators must hold the floor.4 5 This was
viewed as an acceptable "evil" because it allowed other legislation to be
passed in the afternoon session.4 6 "The adoption of the two-track system
changed the game profoundly: It created the silent filibuster-a senator
could filibuster an issue without uttering a word on the Senate floor."
47
The civil rights legislation removed the motivation for restraint and
made any and all bills subject to a possible filibuster.48 Liberal Senators
began to filibuster Republican legislation proffered by the Nixon
Administration. 49  This resulted in Southern senators, who previously
defended filibustering as a promotion of free debate, to vote for cloture. 0
Eventually, because of the immense workload facing the Senate, the two
track system transformed in to a "fantasy track." Bills that are threatened
with a filibuster are now pushed off until the bill's supporters can muster
sixty votes, giving rise to the term "stealth-filibuster."' 51 There no longer is a
"distinction between a filibuster and a threat to filibuster; any credible threat
to filibuster is a filibuster .... 52 Consequently, the old filibuster portrayed
in Mr. Smith Goes to Washington is all but dead. There is no longer the
need to sweat for your conviction by reading Tom Sawyer or the complete
40. Id. (citations omitted).
41. Id. at 200.
42. U.S. Senate, supra note 16.
43. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 200-01.
44. ld. at 201.
45. Id.
46. See id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See id.
50. Id. (citing GARY ORFIELD, CONGRESSIONAL POWER: CONGRESS AND SOCIAL CHANGE 39-43
(1975)).
51. Id. at 202-03.
52. Id. at 203.
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collection of Edgar Allen Poe. It appears that the noble undertones behind
the filibuster of unlimited debate, has dissolved into a pure unadulterated
political scheme to subvert the will of the majority.
B. The Judicial Nomination Process
It has not been but for the last few years that the country has seen the
filibuster tactic used to assail judicial nominees. Indeed, for most of the
existence of this country, judges did not go through the confirmation process
as we see today.53
1. Senate's Committee on the Judiciary
The Senate's Committee on the Judiciary did not exist during the first
half-century of America's existence. 54 Instead, the Senate would either
accept or reject the President's nominees without protracted hearings and
debates.55 In 1925, Harlan Fiske Stone became the first nominee for the
Supreme Court that appeared in person before the Judiciary Committee. 6
However, it was not until John Marshall in 1955 that the modem practice of
nominees testifying at length before the Senate began.57  Even then,
confirmation hearings were generally ephemeral, even when the nominee
was to be confirmed to the Supreme Court.5 8 For instance, in 1962 Justice
53. See Emery G. Lee 111, The Federalist in an Age of Faction: Rethinking Federalist No. 76 On
the Senate's Role in the Judicial Confirmations Process, 30 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 235, 235-37 (2004).
54. Cf Brannon P. Denning, The "Blue Slip": Enforcing the Norms of the Judicial Confirmation
Process, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 75,90 (2001).
55. See generally Arlen Specter, Concluding Address: On the Confirmations of a Supreme Court
Justice, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 1037 (1990).
56. William G. Ross, The Functions, Roles, and Duties of the Senate in the Supreme Court
Appointment Process, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 633, 666-67 (1987).
No nominee testified before the Senate until 1925, when Harlan Fiske Stone appeared
before the Judiciary Committee in order to defend his investigation as Attorney General
into the conduct of Senator Burton Wheeler. Although Stone's appearance before the
Judiciary Committee was a "complete success," his testimony did not establish a custom,
and three decades passed before testimony by a nominee became an established practice.
The testimony of the few nominees appearing before the Judiciary Committee between
1925 and the 1950s was limited to questions about the nominee's past actions. The
committee did not question nominees about judicial philosophy or their opinions on legal
issues. One nominee, Sherman Minton, declined an invitation to appear; and Felix
Frankfurter agreed to testify only about his past actions, explaining that "[m]y attitude
and outlook on relevant matters have been fully expressed over a period of years and are
easily accessible. I should think it not only in bad taste but inconsistent with the duties of
the office for which I have been nominated for me to attempt to supplant my past record
by personal declarations."
Id. (citations omitted).
57. Steven H. Goldberg, Putting the Supreme Court Back in Place: Ideology, Yes; Agenda, No,
17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 175, 183 (2004).
58. See William G. Ross, The Questioning of Supreme Court Nominees at Senate Confirmation
Hearings: Proposals for Accommodating the Needs of the Senate and Ameliorating the Fears of the
Nominees, 62 TUL. L. REV. 109, 119 (1987) ("[T]he scope and length of questions asked by Senators
have become increasingly extensive. Prior to the nomination of Harlan in 1955, no nominee had
been questioned about his views on substantive legal issues.").
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Byron White's confirmation process lasted merely two hours.5 9 Currently,
nominees average eighty-nine days from the presidential nomination to the
senatorial confirmation.6 °
In 1968, President Johnson nominated Justice Fortas to the position of
Chief Justice.6 1 Many argue that Justice Fortas was not confirmed due to the
first filibuster of a judicial nominee.6z This, however, is not completely
accurate, as Justice Fortas was denied the Chief Justice position because his
nomination could not muster the fifty-one votes needed for his confirmation
- not because of a judicial filibuster.63 The debate over his nomination lasted
several days; when supporters of Fortas's nomination filed for a cloture, the
vote failed by a margin of 45-43.64 "In other words, the Fortas nomination
failed to obtain the support of fifty-one Senators. 65
59. Mark C. Rahdert, The Toughest Job Interview in the Land, 2 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV.
293, 300 n.25 (1993).
60. The average time from nomination to confirmation for President Reagan was thirty-nine
days, President George H.W. Bush was eighty-eight days, and President Clinton 115 days. Virginia
Armstrong, The Inevitability of Inseparability: Religion, Ethics, and Federal Judicial Politics, 43 S.
TEX. L. REV. 35, 45 (2001). President George W. Bush averages 112 days from nomination to
confirmation, making the total average 88.5 days. Lloyd Cutler & Mickey Edwards, End the
Judicial Blame Game, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2002, at A29. Interestingly, during the Bush
administration, minorities and women average eight months to get through the confirmation process,
whereas white males only take five months. Joan Biskupic, Politics Snares Court Hopes of
Minorities and Women, USA TODAY, Aug. 22, 2000, at IA.
61. See John Comyn, Our Broken Judicial Confirmation Process and the Need for Filibuster
Reform, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 181, 218 (2003).
62. Id.
63. Id. (citing C. Boyden Gray, A Filibuster Without Precedent, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2003, at
A18).
64. Id. at 220. The events were summarized by Senator Robert P. Griffin as follows:
An examination of the Congressional Record of October 1 ... clearly reveals that the
will of the majority was not frustrated.
It will be noted that the votes of 12 Senators were not recorded. It appears in the
Congressional Record that seven of that number sent word and indicated how they would
have voted had they been present.
The Senator from Oregon [Mr. Morse] and the Senator form Idaho [Mr. Church] would
have voted "yea," raising the total of those in favor of invoking cloture from 45 to 47.
The Record reflects that the Senator from Vermont [Mr. Aiken], the Senator from Nevada
[Mr. Bible], the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. Ellender], the Senator from Alaska [Mr.
Gruening], and the Senator from Maine [Mrs. Smith] would have voted "nay," raising the
total of those opposed to cloture from 43 to 48.
Accordingly, if every Senator who made his position known in the Record had actually
been present and had voted, there would have been 47 votes for cloture and 48 votes
against cloture.
There is no indication in the Record how the other five absent Senators would have
voted.
It should not be overlooked that the distinguished Senator from Kentucky [Mr. Cooper]
announced during the debate that, although he would vote for cloture, he was against the
confirmation of the nomination of Mr. Fortas as Chief Justice.
Id. at 220-21 (quoting 114 CONG. REC. 29,150 (1968) (statement of Sen. Griffin on Lawyers'
Committee on Supreme Court Nominations)).
65. Id. at 220.
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2. The American Bar Association's Role
In addition to the Senate Judiciary Committee, the American Bar
Association (ABA) plays a role in the confirmation of federal judges. Since
1952, the ABA has served as quasi-official reviewer and referee of
America's judges by conducting their "peer reviews."66 The ABA does this
by rating potential judges and sending the results back to the Senate
Judiciary Committee.67
In the past, the ABA's recommendation carried significant weight. In
fact, every President since Eisenhower has relied on the organization's
expertise to screen and rate potential nominees.68 It was not until 1997 that
Senator Hatch stated: "I think the time has come, once and for all, to decide
what role, if any, the ABA should play in the Senate's judicial confirmation
process." 69 Today, the ABA still gives its opinions, which are well received
by some and ignored by others.70
Worth mentioning is the process that was taken with regard to Miguel
Estrada, Justice Priscilla Owen, and other Bush nominees.7' Senator Leahy,
then the ranking Democrat on the Committee, stated that the above
individuals would "go through all right" pending the rating from the ABA.72
Indeed, the ABA did send a response to the Senate, and gave Estrada and
Owen its highest approval: well-qualified.73
66. See Bush Dumps Bar Association's Role in Picking Judges, NewsMax.com, available at
http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2001/3/22/182324.shtml (last visited July 20, 2004)
("[The Bush] administration has abandoned a practice used by presidents for a half century. Since
1952, the bar association has received advance notice on potential judicial appointees. After
examining each candidate's professional reputation, experience and legal writings, a 15-member
committee voted the nominee well qualified, qualified or not qualified."). Also, it is interesting to
note that President Truman asked for such advice informally in 1948. Ronald D. Rotunda,
Innovations Disguised as Traditions: A Historical Review of the Supreme Court Nominations
Process, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 123, 129 (1995).
67. See Cornyn, supra note 61, at 182.
68. Stephan 0. Kline, The Topsy-Turvy World of Judicial Confirmations in the Era of Hatch and
Lott, 103 DICK. L. REv. 247, 270 (1999).
69. Id. (citing Neil Lewis, Head of Senate Judiciary Panel Reconsiders A.B.A. Advisory Role,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1997, at A 15).
70. Compare Carl Tobias, Federal Judicial Selection in the Fourth Circuit, 80 N.C. L. REv.
2001, 2018 (2002) ("Senator Hatch voiced increasing concern about this involvement and, in
February 1997, the chair ended formal ABA participation. During March 2001, the Bush
Administration notified the American Bar Association that it would not solicit its advice prior to
submitting nominations.") and Laura E. Little, The ABA's Role in Prescreening Federal Judicial
Candidates: Are We Ready To Give Up On the Lawyers?, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 37, 44 n.41
(2001) (reporting that Republicans in general are "critical of [the] ABA['s] track record with judicial
nominations"), with Carl Tobias, Sixth Circuit Federal Judicial Selection, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REv.
721, 734 (2003) (stating that "President Clinton relied upon the [ABA] rankings for his entire second
term" when picking judicial nominees).
71. Cornyn, supra note 61, at 182.
72. See id. (quoting Joseph Curl, Bush Sends Nominees in "Good Faith"; Leahy Foresees Few
Foes to "Encouraging" Judicial Batch, WASH. TIMES, May 10, 2001, at Al).
73. Id.
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III. WHY THE PRACTICE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The focus of this article is to discuss the constitutionality of the
filibuster with respect to judicial nominations. The first argument proffered
rests on the idea that the advice and consent clause is non-discretionary,
thus, requiring the Senate to either vote for or against a nominee. Another
argument involves an analysis of the separation of power clause and its
effects on filibustering judicial nominees.
Additional arguments involve the notion of "majoritarianism" and the
fact that the filibuster creates a supermajority where one is not identified in a
"plain" reading of the constitution. Moreover, it may be that the Senate Rule
that sets forth the filibuster is unconstitutional, because it does not allow for
"new" Senates to change the rule with a majority vote.
A. The Advice and Consent Clause is Non-Discretionary
Firefighters do not have a choice to run into a burning building-they
have a moral and professional duty to do so. True, they choose firefighting
as a profession but with that choice comes responsibility. Likewise, many
functions of government are obligations rather than choices, including the
advice and consent clause. The Senate is a body of public servants, sitting to
serve their constituents. Therefore, the power vested to the upper-house of
Congress is to be used for the people.
The constitution reads that the President "shall nominate, and by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint... Judges of the
supreme Court .... Simply put, the President tenders candidates for
judgeships, and the Senate - after debating their qualifications - either
accepts or rejects the candidate with a vote. It does not appear from the text
of the constitution that the Senate has a third option; the third option being
an infinite debate over the confirmation or rejection of the individual,
regardless if the debate is carried out by a majority or a disgruntled minority.
Thus, unlike the firefighter with a moral and professional duty to act, the
Senate, with regard to the advice and consent clause, also has a legal duty to
act.
1. Filibuster of Legislation v. Judicial Nominees
The constitutionality of filibustering legislation is another heated debate.
While many of the arguments made within this article may apply to the
filibustering of legislation, there are two chief distinctions.
74. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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a. History
First, unlike the British system, the American political system is not
built on the foundation of tradition; rather, it is built on a written document
of law. However, it is often helpful to look into the past for guidance.
When looking at the filibuster of legislation we see a long history dating
back to 1790.75  The motive behind the practice may have changed
drastically from a want of unlimited debate, to a political firestorm, but
nonetheless, the institution has stood for over 200 years. 76 This stands in
stark contrast of judicial filibusters, which date back to the "ripe" year of
2003."7
b. Legal Obligation
The second, and most important, difference between filibustering
legislation and judicial nominees is there is no advice and consent clause
with respect to legislation. As stated, Congress has a responsibility to
perform for the people. One such expected performance is the passing of
legislation. However, unlike voting on the President's nominees, the only
obligation the Senate has to legislate is a moral and political one, as
distinguished from a constitutional one.
Moreover, because the constitution empowers all lawmaking authority
within Congress, the filibustering of bills does not have the same
constitutional implications as filibusters against the President's nominees.
This is primarily because in the case of judicial nominees, the main branch
involved is the executive, instead of the legislature as in the passing of bills.
2. Due Process
There are those who believe that in filibustering judicial nominees,
Congress may be in violation of the constitutional requirement of due
process of law.78 "The Senate's duty to hold hearings and, at a minimum, a
full vote on judicial nominees could be construed as part of a larger set of
procedural obligations imposed on the legislature by the Constitution and
enforceable via the Due Process Clause. 7 9
The constitution has a plethora of clauses dealing with how laws are
made.8° This fact suggests that the Founding Fathers were concerned with
75. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 185.
76. Id. at 186.
77. See, e.g., Helen Dewar, Nomination of Texas Judge is Blocked, WASH. POST, May 2, 2003, at
A2 (addressing the first two filibustered nominees).
78. Lee Renzin, Advice, Consent, and Senate Inaction-Is Judicial Resolution Possible?, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1739, 1759 (1998); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V.
79. Renzin, supra note 78, at 1759.
80. Id. at 1761.
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"procedure," at least with the procedure of how laws were enacted.8' The
nucleus of this argument is that a fair procedure will lead to accountability,
which leads to "the basic standard of legislative legitimacy under a
republican form of government. 8 2 Therefore, not only must the substance
of congressional activity pass due process muster, but so must the procedure
in which that activity is developed - a concept called "legislative due
process.83 Hence the next question that must be asked: Is the filibustering
of judicial nominees procedurally legal?
Justice John Paul Stevens answered this question in Fullilove v.
Klutznick84 where he stated: "[f]or just as procedural safeguards are
necessary to guarantee impartial decision making in the judicial process, so
can they play a vital part in preserving the impartial character of the
legislative process." 5 Justice Stevens's concern in Fullilove was rooted in
what he saw as Congress enacting massive amounts of legislation with
almost no deliberation or debate.86  According to one author:Given the
enormity of the subject, Justice Stevens felt Congress gave the matter too
"perfunctory" a consideration, and saw "no reason why the character of
[Congress's] procedures may not be considered relevant to the decision
whether the legislative product has caused a deprivation of liberty or
property without due process of law. 87
Applying Justice Stevens's logic to the issue at hand, "[t]here can be no
more basic a component of accountable democratic process then an open
vote conducted by elected representatives. 88  Indeed, by effectively
rejecting the President's judicial candidates without a vote, "the Senate is
failing to 'play by the rules,' and [ ] violating legislative due process. 8 9
B. Separation of Power
"A trifurcated government structure is arguably the most remarkable
creation of the Framers. It was designed both to enhance the functioning of
each branch and to prevent the aggrandizement of power by one branch." 90
81. Id. (citing Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 291
(1975) and Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories,
89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1067-72 (1980)).
82. Id. at 1761-62 (citing Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 253
(1976)).
83. See id. at 1762.
84. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
85. Id. at 549 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55
NEB. L. REV. 197, 255 (1976)).
86. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 550 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Renzin, supra note 78, at 1762.
,87. Renzin, supra note 78, at 1762 (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 550 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
88. Id. at 1766.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1751.
Thus, when one branch commandeers the power or responsibility of another,
there should be immediate concern.
1. Usurping the Executive Branch
To legislate is a function intrinsic to Congress; however, to appoint
judges is an executive function, a power reserved for the President.91 As
such, obstructing the President from exercising his power and duty to
appoint judges could be seen as an encroachment on an executive function.
Just as the advice and consent clause of the Senate is non-discretionary,
so too is the duty of the President to make appointments. 92 The constitution
states that the President "shall nominate" judicial candidates, thus the
President has the sole power to nominate and the primary power in the
appointment process. 93 However, true-to-form in our government design,
there is a separation of power aspect to the nomination process, which
checks the President's authority. 94 The Senate, being the secondary player
in the judicial confirmation process, has a quasi-veto over the President's
picks, which acts as the "check."95
Historically speaking, the idea of a greater role of the Senate in the
confirmation process was discussed and rejected during the constitution's
formation. The reasons were numerous but the most prominent was the
notion that "public bodies [do not] feel [a] personal responsibility and [I give
full play to intrigue and cabal. 96 Basically, there was a belief, promulgated
by James Madison that the President would be less susceptible to special
interest groups and personal favoritism than would a collective body. 97
The authority given to the Senate, as envisioned by the Framers, was
indeed a powerful one; however, it was not intended as an ability to
"undermine the President's ultimate responsibility for the appointments he
made. ' 9' Alexander Hamilton makes this clear in The Federalist No. 66
when he wrote that:
It will be the office of the President to nominate, and, with the
advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint. There will, of course,
be no exertion of choice on the part of the Senate. They may defeat
one choice of the Executive, and oblige him to make another; but
91. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
92. See supra Part HI-A.
93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added); John C. Eastman, The Limited Nature of the
Senate's Advice and Consent Role, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 633, 635 (2003). Professor Eastman
states that "[tihe appointment power of Article H, § 2 is divided into two clauses - the power to
nominate and the power to appoint. The former is committed exclusively to the President; the latter
is also committed to the President, but with the advice and consent of the Senate." Id. at 635 n.6.
94. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
95. Id.
96. Eastman, supra note 93, at 635 (citing 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 42 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)).
97. Id. at 642-43; see THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison); see also THE FEDERALIST No.
51 (James Madison).
98. Eastman, supra note 93, at 646.
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they cannot themselves choose-they can only ratify or reject the
choice he may have made.99
By filibustering judicial nominees because of their personal philosophy,
which is arguably what is happing now, the Senate is moving well beyond
their authority and trespassing on a clear executive function. By imposing
an ideological litmus test on presidential nominees, the Senate is doing more
than rejecting or accepting - they are effectively choosing by narrowing the
type of individual that can be nominated. "In this way, the Senate seems to
be arrogating to itself the nomination as well as the confirmation power."' 00
This is a clear violation of the separation of power clause.
2. Usurping the Judicial Branch
"The Framers never thought that one branch of government should love
another. Despite the old working definition of a federal judge as a lawyer
who has friends in the Senate, a fairly high level of hostility is built into the
relationship between Congress and the courts."''1 1
a. Log-Jamming
Beyond the philosophical argument above, there is a pragmatic
argument suggesting that filibustering judicial nominees is a breach of
separation of power. Essentially by preventing nominees from being
confirmed, the Senate is placing a burden on the rest of the judiciary.
Chief Justice Rehnquist echoed this concern by stating in his annual
report that there is a crisis in the judiciary due to "an alarming number of
judicial vacancies."10 2 Currently, there are forty-four judicial vacancies with
an additional sixteen planed future vacancies; eighteen of these have
individuals who have been nominated by the President to fill the judgeships
99. THE FEDERALIST No. 66 (Alexander Hamilton).
100. Eastman, supra note 93, at 652. Professor Eastman also explains this idea of senatorial
encroachment by stating that "[t]he Senate has the power to refuse nominees, but in the
Constitutional scheme it has no proper authority in picking the nominees--either through direct
choice or through logrolling and deal-making." Id. at 645.
101. Dennis Jacobs, Trust and Jurisdiction - The Tug-of-War Between Congress and the Federal
Courts, 22 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 55, 55 (1998).
102. William H. Rehnquist, 2001 Year-End Report on The Federal Judiciary, available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/200lyear-endreport.htm (last visited Aug. 1,
2004) [hereinafter Rehnquist, 20011. Justice Rehnquist addressed this issue again in 2002 by stating
that there are "too many judicial vacancies." William H. Rehnquist, 2002 Year-End Report on The
Federal Judiciary, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2002year-
endreport.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2004) [hereinafter Rehnquist, 2002]. In 2003 Justice Rehnquist
once more expressed concern about the vacancies in the Circuit Courts. William H. Rehnquist, 2003
Year-End Report on The Federal Judiciary, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/
year-end/2003year-endreport.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2004) [hereinafter Rehnquist, 2003].
and are awaiting the Senate's confirmation.' °3 More worrisome are the
twenty "emergency vacancies," some of which have been pending for nearly
ten years. 104
The separation of power between the branches is breached when one
branch, the legislative, is able to subjugate another branch, the judiciary,
with a workload beyond its capacity. The Senate may not have put the
judiciary into a position where it is crumbling due to a massive caseload
with too few judges; however, this argument exposes the truth about
filibustering judicial nominees. The framers clearly wanted each branch to
be an independent entity, without domination of one branch over another.
Therefore, is it reasonable that the framers would have made such error' - to
allow one half of one branch to strangle another with work?
It is important to note that there is little dispute that Congress, through
legislation and the President's signature, could eradicate the lower court
altogether. 10 5  However, this action requires both houses of Congress;
distinguished from the one house filibuster.0 6
b. Court Packing
Just as the court-packing scheme was an attempt by the Executive, then
President Franklin Roosevelt, to appropriate power from the Judicial Branch,
so is the filibustering of judicial nominees an attempt by the Legislative
Branch to steal power from the courts.
The entire purpose of giving federal judges life tenure was to limit
politicking within the Judicial Branch. 10 7  Therefore, just as impeaching
judges "to enforce [a] political orthodoxy"'1 8 would be a devastating blow to
the independence of the Judicial Branch, so is the "ideological litmus test"
currently being implemented against judicial nominees.' 9 By filibustering
nominees that do not fit into a particular political box, the current Senate is
participating in the modem day court-packing scheme.
103. Federal Judicial Vacancies, Reports, United States Courts, available at http://www.uscourts.
gov/vacancies/emergencies2.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
104. Id.
105. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1364-65 (1953) (discussing the fact that Congress's
power over the courts is only inhibited on actions which will "destroy the essential role of the
Supreme Court in the constitutional plan").
106. See id.
107. See Jason C. Matson, Running Circles Around Marathon? The Effects of Accounts
Receivable as Core or Noncore Proceedings on the Article III Courts, 20 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J.
451, 505 (2004).
108. Eastman, supra note 93, at 651.
109. Id.
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3. Presentment and Bicameralism
The constitution is unequivocally clear that in order for a bill to become
law it must pass through both the lower and upper house and be presented to
the President of the United States for signature or veto.' 10
The Court in INS v. Chadha held "that a one house legislative veto was
unconstitutional because of the absence of bicameralism and
presentment."' Moreover, the Court went on to say that if the action is
determined, upon scrutiny, to be "essentially legislative in purpose and
effect" then passage by a majority of both Houses is necessary.12
Therefore, as the Senate continues to filibuster judicial nominees and
reduce the judiciary by attrition, a violation of the constitution becomes
evident." 3 This is so in that "the Senate's actions are equivalent to a de
facto one house repeal of legislation establishing the size of the judiciary, in
violation of the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and
presentment."' 
14
Congress has been given the authority by the constitution to establish
laws controlling the number of positions in the federal courts.1" 5 However,
in exercising this authority, it must act within the procedures proscribed in
Article I of the Constitution, including bicameralism and presentment."
6
C. A New Supermajority
The constitution establishes a general structure of majority rule" 17
Accordingly, there is a presumption that a majority of Congress is all that is
necessary for most decisions.1 8 This is true, except decisions for which the
constitution specifically requires a supermajority or two-thirds.
110. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall,
before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve
he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it
shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and
proceed to reconsider it.
Id.
111. See Renzin, supra note 78, at 1770 (citing INS. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 957-59 (1983)); see
also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 957-59 (1983).
112. INS, 462 U.S. at952.
113. See Renzin, supra note 78, at 1770.
114. Id.
115. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 400-01 (1973) (stating that Congress has no
constitutional obligation to make Article III courts); David L. Shapiro, Federal Diversity
Jurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal, 91 HARV. L. REV. 317, 341 (1977) (remarking that Congress
has "broad, perhaps plenary power to limit federal jurisdiction ... .
116. INS, 462U.S. at921.
117. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 242-45.
118. See id.
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1. The True Supermajorities
Presently the constitution calls for a supermajority on seven occasions.
As discussed in detail below, the Senate must vote with two-thirds to ratify a
President's treaty.11 9 Also, in order for the Senate to convict an officer in an
impeachment trial they must be able to muster two-thirds of the senators
present. 120 As seen in President Clinton's trial, this is easier said than done.
In addition to impeachment, both the Senate and the House have the ability
to oust one of their members for bad conduct; but again, this requires a two-
thirds vote from the expelling house.
12 1
In some cases the action sought by Congress is so momentous that the
constitution requires a supermajority in both the Senate and the House. For
instance, individuals that have engaged in insurrection or rebellion may not
hold office unless Congress as a whole removes the disability by a two-
thirds vote. 12 2 The President's veto is one of the most significant powers in
the "checks and balances" form of government.1 23  As such, in order for
Congress to override the executive veto they need a two-thirds vote from
both the Senate and the House. 124 Another supermajority is necessary with
regard to the President's capacity to govern. Specifically one step in
determining that the President is disabled is a two-thirds vote from both
chambers in Congress.
25
119. U.S. CONST. art. H, § 2, cl. 2. ("[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur .... ); see also infra Part 111-B-2.
120. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. ("The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all
Impeachments.... When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside:
And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.").
121. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. ("Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings,
punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a
Member.").
122. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3.
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and
Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any
State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of
the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial
officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged
in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.
Id.
123. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
124. Id.
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of
Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be
presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect,
shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of
the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations
prescribed in the Case of a Bill.
Id.
125. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4 ("Congress is required to assemble, determines by two-thirds
vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office ... ").
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The last supermajority pertains to the most dramatic change legally
available in our republic: a constitutional amendment. A proposal for a
change to the Document must be accompanied by a two-thirds vote. 126 After
that, the proposal moves to the State Legislatures for consideration.'27
2. A Simple Reading
Theodore Sedgwick's A Treatise on the Rules which Govern the
Interpretation and Construction of Statutory and Constitutional Law, 28
published in 1857, stated the plain meaning rule: "if the [constitutional
wording] is plain and unambiguous there is no room for construction or
interpretation."'
' 29
Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the constitution reads that the President
"shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate to
make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall
appoint Ambassadors ... Judges of the supreme Court .. . "30 Here, the
founding fathers made it clear that the President needs two-thirds of the
Senate to ratify a treaty. This is an extremely significant sentence in this
present debate not for what it says, but rather, for what it does not say - that
the President needs two-thirds of the Senate to confirm nominees for the
bench.
This is a clear example involving the canon of constitutional
construction, espressio unius est exclusio alterius. Roughly, this canon
reads that to state "one thing is to exclude the other.'' 1. 1 Pertaining to the
issue at hand, by requiring a supermajority for treaties, the framers excluded
the requirement for judicial confirmation. 132
While no serious scholar or politician would argue that there is, in fact, a
constitutional supermajority requirement for confirming judicial nominees,
one has effectively been invented by the filibustering senators. It is of little
consequence if the reason for requiring a supermajority for judicial
nominees is political squabbling, a true effort to defend unlimited debate in
the Senate, or the new modus operandi to keep radical judges off the bench -
126. U.S. CONST. art. V ("The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution . .
127. Id.
128. THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION
AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1857).
129. Id. at 231.
130. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
131. M.B.W. Sinclair, Law and Language: The Role of Pragments in Statutory Interpretation, 46
U. Prr-r. L. REV. 373, 414 (1985).
132. See id.
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the effect is the same, an eighth supermajority requirement where one was
never intended.
D. Constitutional Amendment by Proxy
Interestingly, the tradition behind the right of unlimited and free debate
was established by the Senate's desire for autonomy from the Executive
Branch, rather than from trepidation over minority rights.'33
In United States v. Ballin,34 the Supreme Court unanimously held that
"Ithe Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of
proceedings. [However,] [i]t may not by its rules ignore constitutional
restraints ... ." 135 "The power to make rules is not one which once
exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be
exercised by the house, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and
beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."'136  For this reason,
Congress could not enact a law that subsequently could not be repealed by a
majority in a future Congress. 137 Within the same logic, the Senate cannot
entrench rules that do not allow change by a majority of a future Senate.
This principle of the legislature not being allowed to bind future
legislatures dates back to Blackstone:
Acts of parliament derogatory from the power of subsequent
parliaments bind not .... Because the legislature, being in truth the
sovereign power, is always of equal, always of absolute authority: it
acknowledges no superior upon earth, which the prior legislature
must have been, if it's [sic] ordinances could bind the present
parliament. 138
Unlike the rules in the House of Representatives, which are adopted
every two years, the Senate's rules are continuous. 139 Rule V states that the
rules "continue from one Congress to the next Congress unless they are
changed as provided in [the] rules."'14  Compounding the problem is that
133. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 190.
134. 144 U.S. 1 (1892).
135. Id. at 5. The Court went on to say:
[T]here should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these
limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the house, and it is no
impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate or
even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been
prescribed and in force for a length of time.
Id.
136. Id.
137. See id.
138. John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative
Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483, 505 (1995) (citing 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *90) (stating that Blackstone traces the traditional view to Cicero).
139. Neals-Erik William Delker, The House Three-Fifths Tax Rule: Majority Rule, the Framers'
Intent, and the Judiciary's Role, 100 DICK. L. REv. 341, 357 n.78 (1996).
140. Standing Rules of the Senate, Rule V, Precedence of Motions, available at http://rules.senate.
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unlike the House, which requires only a majority vote to change its internal
rules, the Senate demands a super-majority to alter or abolish its rules,
including the filibuster. 14' Rule XXII itself provides that "on a measure or
motion to amend the Senate rules... the necessary affirmative vote shall be
two-thirds of the Senators present and voting .... ,142 Consequently, unless
one party can amass a two-third advantage on a movement, the minority
party can always conduct a filibuster and defeat any attempt to modify the
rules regulating the filibuster.143  "Because the filibuster enormously
increases the minority's power and gives it the ability to block bills it
opposes, the minority party would have every incentive to do so.,'"
What has effectively happened is that the Senate that adopted Rule XXII
has barred the possibility of a future majority in the Senate to change it.' 45
This is evidenced by the fact that Rules V and XXII together have the effect
of allowing one session of the Senate to bind all future sessions to its method
of enacting legislation or confirming nominees.
46
Rule XXII effectively extends a supermajority requirement to the
passage of any measure before it, including proposed rule changes.
Rule V preserves all Senate rules from one session to the next. The
Senate thus violates the Court's declaration in Newton [v.
Commissioners, 100 U.S. 548, 559 (1879)] by depriving
"succeeding legislature[s] ... [of] the same jurisdiction and
power... as its predecessors."'' 47
Contradictorily, the Supreme Court has specifically prohibited this type
of action, 48 holding that there are undeniable grounds forbidding such
gov/senaterules/rule05.htm (last visited Aug. 1 2004) [hereinafter Standing Rules of the Senate].
"Because the entire membership of the House is determined every two years, the House is not
considered to be a continuing body. In contrast, the Senate considers itself to be a continuing body
because only one-third of the Senate seats are the subject of election every two years." Fisk &
Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 245.
141. Compare Delker, supra note 139, at 382 n.78 (1996) (stating that "[s]ince every two years
the House is considered a separate body from preceding Houses, rules of a prior House are not
binding on a subsequent House"), with Standing Rules of the Senate, supra note 140, at Rule V.
142. Standing Rules of the Senate, supra note 140, at Rule XXII.
143. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 245-46.
144. Id. at 246.
145. See id.
146. Id. at 248.
147. Id. at 248-49 (quoting Newton v. Commissioners, 100 U.S. 548, 559 (1879)).
148. Id. at 247-48.
The United States Supreme Court often has expressed this principle against legislative
entrenchment. In Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Co. v. Debolt, the Court held that one
session of a legislature could not limit the ability of a future session to impose taxes. [57
U.S. (16 How.) 416, 440 (1853).] Similarly, in Newton v. Commissioners, the Court
ruled that the Ohio legislature could move its state capitol, notwithstanding decisions by a
legislature thirty years earlier as to its location. [100 U.S. 548 (1879).] Although the
American Constitution rejects the notion of parliamentary sovereignty, it retained that of
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legislative entrenchment. 149 "First, American democracy is premised upon
government by the people, as expressed through representatives. Popular
sovereignty is frustrated when one session of the legislature can prevent or
limit action by future sessions."'
150
Second, such entrenchment upsets the balance of legislative
accountability that is essential for a properly functioning democratic
government. 15' A central tenant to the Democracy form of government is
that the people can hold their representatives accountable by threatening to
elect a different representative. 52 "The knowledge that behavior in office
must be submitted to the voters for approval deters unwise judgments, or
failing that, enables the people to replace public officials with others who
will implement better policies."'1
53
Therefore, the entrenchment of the Senate's filibuster rule obstructs the
accountability that is necessary in a democratic society.' 54  As has been
noted:
Absent the very unlikely event that a Senate is elected where two-
thirds of the members will vote for repeal or reform, the people
cannot change filibuster rules no matter how much they may dislike
them. The senators responsible for enacting the rules cannot be
legislative equality - "the legislature does not have the power to bind itself in the
future." [John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of
Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483, 506 (1995).] In
Stone v. Mississippi, the Court held that the contract clause in Article I, Section 10 of the
Constitution did not limit the ability of legislatures to adopt laws that they believed to be
reasonable exercises of the police power. [101 U.S. 814 (1880).] It was the Court's
belief that any other view would impermissibly allow one legislature's acts to bind the
hands of the future sessions of the legislature. [See id. at 818.]
In many other cases, the Court has expressed the same view that it is unconstitutional for
a legislature to bind its successors. In Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, the
Court said: "[Elach subsequent legislature has equal power to legislate upon the same
subject. The legislature has power at any time to repeal or modify [an] act." [172 U.S.
602, 621 (1898).] In Reichelderfer v. Quinn, the Court echoed this and remarked that
"the will of a particular Congress which does not impose itself upon those to follow in
succeeding years." [287 U.S. 315, 318 (1932).].
Id.
149. Id. at 249.
150. Id.
Just as the members of Congress lack power to extend their terms beyond those set by the
Constitution, they may not undermine the spirit of that document by immutably extending their
influence beyond those terms. Each election furnishes the electorate with an opportunity to provide
new direction for its representatives. This process would be reduced to an exercise in futility were
the newly elected representatives bound by the policy choice of a prior generation of voters.
Id. (quoting Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and
Retroactivity, 1897 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 379, 404-05) (internal quotations omitted).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 250.
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held accountable because they are no longer members of the
body. 155
This vicious circle continues where the present senators cannot be fairly held
accountable for not passing legislation over filibusters or changing the rules
themselves because of the exhausting and nearly impossible requirements of
doing so.156 This "[e]ntrenchment's obstruction of the legislature's inherent
authority to adapt to current circumstances represents a serious infringement
upon the right of the electorate to rule according to its will.
157
IV. CLEAN HANDS: THE STENCH OF POLITICS
'A nomination delayed is justice delayed. As we know, justice delayed
is justice denied. A vacancy unfilled is justice unfulfilled.""J58 This was a
comment made by Senator Russ Feingold from Wisconsin addressing the
GOP's failure to confirm President Clinton's nominees. 59 Apparently,
Senator Feingold has had a change in philosophy, because in 2003 he
became a leader in filibustering President Bush's nominees, thus, in his very
words, denying justice. 6
It is not clear why some of the recently opposed nominees face
resistance in the first place. Senator Clinton tried to answer this question by
stating that the nominees were "lemons."' 161 Senator Edward Kennedy went
further, when he stated that the nominees were "Neanderthal[s].' 62
This political wrangling came to a boiling point "after portions of more
than a dozen memos from Judiciary Democrats were published in a Wall
Street Journal editorial ... .,,163 The memos suggested that the filibusters
were an attempt to deny, "qualified minority nominees because powerful far-
left interest groups [ ] want to deny Republicans the perceived political
capital associated with appointing minorities to the federal bench."' 64
Maybe even more amazing than the spectacle of "secret memos" (which
has to be politics at its worst) is the outrageous hypocrisy that follows the
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Craig Gilbert, 3 Seeking Feingold Seat Attack Him on Judges Issue, THE MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Nov. 18, 2003, at 2A (quoting Sen. Russ Feingold).
159. Id.
160. See id. (quoting Feingold as saying in reference to "the GOP's failure to move a Clinton
nominee [in 1999]: 'A nomination delayed is justice delayed. As we know, justice delayed is justice
denied."').
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Paul Kane, Democrats on Judiciary Scoffat Hatch's Overture, ROLL CALL, Feb. 4, 2004,
available at, 2004 WL 61550661.
164. Jonathan M. Stein, Legal Memo to the Democrats; The Leakers Are Not the Problem, WASH.
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2003, at A23.
controversy. Democrats presently claim that their principles determine
when a filibuster should be engaged to prevent a nominee from taking the
bench, however, that was not always their stance. 165 Likewise, Republicans
wail and gnash their teeth at the filibustering of nominees, unfortunately,
while they have not engaged in filibustering per se, they have been just as
obstructive in the nominee process.1
66
A. Same Sin, Different Apple
Many of the Senators that are supporting the filibusters have made
comments in the past rebuking the practice under the veil of a moral code.' 6 7
On the Congressional Record, Senator Daschle stated:
The Constitution is straightforward about the few instances in which
more than a majority of the Congress must vote: A veto override, a
treaty, and a finding of guilt in an impeachment proceeding. Every
other action by the Congress is taken by majority vote. The
Founders debated the idea of requiring more than a majority to
approve legislation. They concluded that putting such immense
power into the hands of a minority ran squarely against the
democratic principle. Democracy means majority rule, not minority
gridlock
168
The Senator went on to say in 1999 with regard to the nominees
proffered by President Clinton that:
As Chief Justice Rehnquist has recognized: "The Senate is surely
under no obligation to confirm any particular nominee, but after the
necessary time for inquiry it should vote him up or vote him down."
An up-or-down vote, that is all we ask.., they deserve at least that
much .... I must say, I find it simply baffling that a Senator would
vote against even voting on a judicial nomination. Today's actions
prove that we all understand that we have a constitutional outlet for
antipathy against a judicial nominee-a vote against that
nominee .... Thus, today, I implore, one more time, every Senator
to follow Senator Leahy's advice, and treat every nominee "with
dignity and dispatch." Lift your holds, and let the Senate vote on
every nomination. 169
Conversely, now that a Republican is doing the nominating, Senator
Daschle is not as enthusiastic of his stated conviction. In fact, Senator
165. Gilbert, supra note 158.
166. See Heidi Pauken, Injudicious, AM. PROSPECT, Apr. 1, 2004, at 11.
167. See Cornyn, supra note 61, at 198-99.
168. Id. (citing 141 CONG. REc. 2832 (statement of Sen. Daschle) (emphasis added)).
169. Id. at 207 (citing 145 CONG. REC. S11,919 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1999) (statement of Sen.
Daschle)).
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Daschle, along with other Democrats has led the effort to filibuster certain
nominees, thus, preventing them from receiving an up or down vote.
70
Regrettably, this double-standard crosses party lines. In 1994 Senator
Hatch stated he "personally d[id] not want to filibuster Federal judges. The
President won the election. He ought to have the right to appoint the judges
he wants to.", 17  More recently, he has been one of the leaders in the Senate
to stop the filibustering of judicial nominees. Despite this rhetoric, Senator
Hatch, during the Clinton years, personally facilitated the "committee
filibustering" by frustrating certain nominees' ability to have committee
hearings.
72
"To say that many Clinton nominees never received hearings during
President Clinton's second term oversimplifies what occurred."'' 7 3 Many of
President Clinton's nominees were placed on an informal hold.' 74  This
170. See Carl Hulse, Congress Goes Home After Surly Session, Pir. POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 30,
2003, at A14. Other Senators who are participating in the filibustering objected to the very practice
when President Clinton was in office. See Cornyn, supra note 61, at 207. Senator Biden stated:
[E]veryone who is nominated is entitled to have a shot, to have a hearing and to have a shot to be
heard on the floor and have a vote on the floor .... It is totally appropriate... to reject every single
nominee if they want to. That is within their right. But it is not.., appropriate not to have hearings
on them, not to bring them to the floor and not to allow a vote.
Id. (citing 143 CONG. REC. S2541 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Biden)). Senator
Boxer also showed distain for obstructing judicial nominees when she stated that "[a]ccording to the
U.S. Constitution, the President nominates, and the Senate shall provide advice and consent. It is not
the role of the Senate to obstruct the process and prevent numbers of highly qualified nominees from
even being given the opportunity for a vote on the Senate floor." Id. (citing 143 CONG. REC. S4420-
21 (daily ed. May 14, 1997) (statement of Sen. Boxer)). Senator Durbin agreed, stating, "[i]f, after
150 days languishing on the Executive Calendar that name has not been called for a vote, it should
be. Vote the person up or down." Id. (citing 144 CONG. REc. S11031 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1998)
(statement of Sen. Durbin)). Senator Feinstein also agreed with this premise when she stated:
A nominee is entitled to a vote. Vote them up; vote them down .... What this does to a [nominee's]
life is, it leaves them in limbo ... It is our job to confirm these judges. If we don't like them, we can
vote against them. That is the honest thing to do. If there are things in their background, in their
abilities that don't pass muster, vote no.
Id. (citing 145 CONG. REC. S 11,014-15 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1999) (statement of Sen. Feinstein)).
171. See Comyn, supra note 61, at 208 (citing 140 CONG. REc. 27,470 (1994) (statement of Sen.
Hatch)).
172. Pauken, supra note 166, at 11.
During the six Clinton years that Republicans controlled Congress, Judiciary Committee
Chairman Orrin Hatch faithfully administered the "blue-slip" policy, which allowed
home-state senators to effectively veto nominees by not returning their evaluation forms
to the committee. In 1998, the slips carried language stating that "[n]o further
proceedings on this nominee will be scheduled until both blue slips have been returned by
the nominee's home state senators."
Today Hatch still reigns, but the blue-slip policy doesn't: The Utah Republican announced early in
2003 that the slips were merely advisory, claiming that that had always been the case.
Id. However, it was widely know that the blue-slip was a tactic used to contain an unwanted
nominee in committee for an indefinite period. See id.
173. Michael M. Gallagher, Disarming the Confirmation Process, 50 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 513, 527
(2003).
174. Id.
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resulted in Senate Republicans never allowing the nominees on hold to
appear before the Senate Judiciary Committee. 175  "Some nominees went
years before they received a hearing; other nominees never even received
hearings. The number of confirmed judges declined steadily after 1996,
leading many commentators to claim that a vacancy crisis existed in the
federal judiciary. 176
The "committee filibuster" fundamentally has the same constitutional
implications argued above; it is essentially a judicial filibuster with a
different wrapping. 7 7  In fact, many argue that this type of filibustering is
more egregious because instead of an exhausting debate, which is viewed
virtuous, there is no debate at all.
78
B. Do Unto Others as Done to You
Clearly, some Democrats are filibustering President Bush's nominees as
a response to the treatment President Clinton's nominees received while he
was in office. 179  Republicans have launched elaborate, grand standing
175. Id.
Senate Democrats accused Senate Republicans of changing the "rules of the game" in the
confirmation process. Senate Republicans, of course, claimed that they were merely
exercising the powers of "advice and consent." Others noted that Senate Republicans
were gaining political revenge for the Bork nomination. Advice and consent became
"abuse and dissent"; few people were satisfied with the confirmation process. The
confirmation process stalled completely in President Clinton's last year in office,
prompting President Clinton to utilize a recess appointment to nominate Roger Gregory
for a seat on the Fourth Circuit.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
176. Id.; see also Elliot E. Slotnick, Prologue: Federal Judicial Selection in the New Millennium,
36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 587, 592-93 (2003); Peter M. Shane, When Inter-Branch Norms Break
Down: Of Arms-For-Hostages, "Orderly Shutdowns, " Presidential Impeachments, and Judicial
"Coups ", 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 503, 527 (2003).
Democrats subjected George H.W. Bush's federal district court nominees to an average
of 92 days' delay after their nomination before granting them hearings. In contrast,
during the first half of Clinton's second term, Republicans delayed hearings for Clinton's
district court nominees an average of 161 days. These averages do not include nominees
denied a hearing altogether. At the end of the 106th Congress, 40 nominees remained
stalled in the Senate Judiciary Committee, 36 of whom had never been granted a hearing.
Id.; see also Rehnquist, 2001, supra note 102; Rehnquist, 2002, supra note 102; Rehnquist, 2003,
supra note 102.
177. See supra Part III.
178. Senate Republican Leaders Prepare For Marathon Debate, CONGRESS DAILY, Nov. 12,
2003, available at 2003 WL 65939184. The irony is by arguing that the bottling up a nominee in
committee is worse than filibustering a nominee, you are essentially saying that "yes, holding up a
nominee is wrong, but they are 'wronger,' thus, my behavior is OK." This complements the notion
that the practice is more about getting back than it is about convictions. See infra Part 1-B.
179. See Judge Andrew Napolitano & Major Garrett, Fox News: The Big Story With John Gibson,
Fox NEWS, Nov. 13, 2003, available at 2003 WL 7106085 (stating that it is time for Democrats to
payback "Republicans who as the majority party in the latter stages of the Clinton presidency buried
dozens of Clinton judicial nominees in committee, denying them hearings and votes on the Senate
floor. Democrats called these tactics less visible means of obstruction and a filibuster by another
name."). This point is again exemplified by Senator Hillary Clinton, when she stated in response to
filibustering that "Republicans had stiffed 63 judicial nominees without giving them even a
committee vote during the Clinton administration," thus, showing a clear motive for the filibuster
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speeches and demonstrations against the filibustering. 80 At the same time,
Republicans have taken very little real steps to stop the abuse.'
81
This lack of effort could be the result of Republicans realizing that they
will not hold the majority in the Senate indefinitely. Therefore, they do not
want to completely ban the tactic because they may use it on a future
Democratic President's nominees. As one commentator said:
Where Congress is concerned, the old truism that "what goes
around comes around" needs to be amended. Around here, it comes
back around with a vengeance, creating a precedent for more
vengeance the next time. In the Senate, Republicans blocked
President Bill Clinton's judicial nominations in the Judiciary
Committee and now Democrats are filibustering President Bush's
nominees. When a Democrat next becomes president, Republicans
surely will filibuster his (or her) nominees. 82
This mind-set is the epitome of politics gone astray.
C. The Role of Ideology in the Advice and Consent Stage
New York Senator Charles Schumer stated that the role of the Senate in
the confirmation process is to gain a balance of judicial ideologies on the
bench. 83  In other words, some in the Senate believe that judicial
nominations should fall into a predetermined category based on political
ideology of the party of the nominating president.' 84 Senator Schumer,
speaking about the D.C. Circuit, went on to say that the circuit was
"balanced" because it has "four Republican judges, four Democrats...
Some of us believe that this all-important court should be kept in
balance.' 85  This notion is impossible considering the structure of our
government. What would be done if a Democrat or Republican sat in the
Oval office for twelve, sixteen, or twenty years? Would Senator Schumer
suggest we keep any empty seats vacant until the opposite party won an
election? As mentioned, this is a type of court packing that breaches the
separation of power doctrine.
being retribution. Anne Q. Hoy, In Senate, Change Is a 4-Letter Word, NEWSDAY, Nov. 14, 2003, at
A05.
180. Major Garrett & Brian Wilson, Senate Talkfest Long on Drams, Short on Substance, Fox
NEWS, available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,102938,00.html (last visited Nov. 13,
2003).
181. See id.
182. Editorials, Oppression, ROLL CALL, June 18, 2003, available at 2003 WL 7691054.
183. See Judicial Nominations: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong.
(2002).
184. See id.
185. Id.
There is no constitutional requirement of a balance of ideology on the
bench. Indeed, it is the duty to decide cases without passion or ideology that
is required of judges.186 In reading the Federalist Papers, we see that the
founding fathers stressed the qualification of judges on judicial philosophy,
rather than judicial ideology. 187 In particular, Alexander Hamilton stated:
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of
the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the
judges, as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to
ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act
proceeding from the legislative body .... The courts must declare
the sense of the law; and if they should be disposed to exercise
WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be
the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body.'
88
This attitude about a balance of ideology in the judiciary may be the root
of the problem. On several occasions, senators from both sides of the aisle
have proffered the logic that they are not only entitled to holding up
nominees, but they are, in fact, noble because the candidates are
"extreme."'' 89  This argument seems disingenuous. For instance, when
democrats say they are blocking a prospective judge because that judge is
"pro-life," they are essentially saying that to be a federal judge, you must be
"pro-choice."' 90 This is an inequitable argument because on the one hand
they want judges that are not "extreme," but they define "extreme" as
anything that is not encompassed in their political spectrum. A more
appropriate definition of an extreme candidate would be any one who gives
indications on how she would rule on a potential case, thus, wearing her
ideology on her sleeve.
186. Stephen B. Presser, The Role of the Senate in Judicial Confirmations, 4 ENGAGE J. FED. Soc.
PRACT. GRP. 66, 67 (2003).
187. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton); Presser, supra note 186, at 67.
188. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
189. See, e.g., Walpin, supra note 4, at 100-01 (stating that "[t]hose who opposed Estrada's
nomination did not even question his ability and integrity. Rather, the Democratic opposition was
directed solely to Estrada's purported ideology, as exemplified by Senators Hilary Clinton (D-NY)
and Charles Schumer's (D-NY) description of Estrada as a 'far-fight stealth nominee"'). But see,
e.g., Shane, supra note 176, at 526-27.
190. See, e.g., Ronald J. Tabak, Why an Independent Appointing Authority Is Necessary to Choose
Counsel for Indigent People in Capital Punishment Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1105, 1109 (2003).
At the federal level, ranking minority member on the Senate Judiciary Committee, Orrin
G. Hatch, who now chairs the Committee, announced in 1993 that Republicans would
challenge any judicial nominees of the new President, Bill Clinton, who would "look for
excuses not to carry" out capital punishment. Republican staffers pointed out that "the
death penalty is a politically potent issue and worth raising, even if they have limited
success in opposing judicial nominees." Among those whom Senate Republicans
unsuccessfully opposed in their two years in the minority at the outset of the Clinton
administration were Rosemary Barkett and Martha Craig Daughtrey, both of whom were
confirmed for court of appeals positions. The Republicans gained control of the Senate
in 1995, and continued to use the death penalty as an issue in the judicial confirmation
process.
Id. (citations omitted).
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V. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPACT
The next question that must be raised after determining that filibustering
judicial nominees is unconstitutional is "so what?" Just because the practice
may, by the black letter of the law, be technically unconstitutional does not
necessarily mean there is negative impact. Furthermore, a verdict of
unconstitutionality and injury has no weight if it has no teeth. Thus, in order
to have a meaningful debate, one must proffer solutions to remedy the
situation or, at the minimum, reduce the hemorrhaging.
A. Impact on the Constitution
The ACLU has long argued that to protect the constitution one must
fight every battle ferociously in order to protect the entire document.'91
Hence, the result is a precarious position of a civil rights organization
defending neo-Nazi's right to march in a Jewish settled city, many of whom
were holocaust survivors.192 The same argument has been tendered by the
NRA, where members argue that allowing any "anti-gun" legislation would
fray the rug and eventually unravel the entire Second Amendment. This
"slippery slope" argument also applies to the situation at hand. Here, as
argued, the Senate is conducting blatant constitutional violations, by
violating: the advice and consent clause; separation of power doctrine;
presentment clause; bicameralism clause; and the majority doctrine.
Therefore, by discounting the constitution in one aspect, there is a
weakening of the document as a whole.
1. Circumventing with Recess Appointments
An additional unintended constitutional ramification is being played out
in the recess appointment debate. Here, the President, in response to the
filibustering of his nominees, may act in an unconstitutional manner by
circumventing the Senate with such appointments.
191. See generally ARYEH NEIER, DEFENDING My ENEMY: AMERICAN NAzis, THE SKOKIE CASE,
AND THE RISKS OF FREEDOM 4-5 (1979).
192. Id.; see also Nat'l Socialist Party v. Vill. of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977) (per curiam) (holding
that a state may not impose prior-restraint of the swastika being displayed during a Nazi assembly
without also providing immediate appellate review of such restraint); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969) (holding that a state may not convict a KKK member of criminal syndicalism because his
activity was not intended for inciting imminent lawless conduct that was likely to succeed); Collin v.
Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (holding that Skokie law barring Nazi marches violated the
first amendment because the law was a content-based restriction of speech), aftd, 578 F.2d 1197
(7th Cir. 1978); Rockwell v. Morris, 12 A.D.2d 272 (N.Y. 1961) (holding that the first amendment
allows a neo-Nazi leader to hold a rally in a park despite anticipated hostile reaction from spectators,
and that police are obligated to protect them), affd, 176 N.E.2d 836 (1961), amended, 177 N.E.2d
48 (1961).
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In accordance with the Recess Appointment Clause, the President is
authorized to make appointments to vacant offices when the Senate is in
recess.193  Specifically the clause reads that "[t]he President shall have
Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the
Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next
Session."' 194 These appointments originated as a means to temporarily fill
vacancies during the days when Congress adjourned for extended periods.' 95
Recently, many have argued, and the President has complied in a limited
sense, that the President should use this approach as an end-run around the
Senate entirely and appoint his filibustered nominees. 196  However, this
argument of "two wrongs make a right" only compounds the problem.
"[P]residents have come to refrain from using their undoubtedly
constitutional power to make recess appointments, in part out of concern
about possible intrusions on judicial independence that arise from the
possibility that a recess nominee will not receive a permanent
position ... ,,197 The idea of a "one-term" judge was never intended by the
framers. 98
B. Impact on the Legislative Process
Beyond the obvious impacts of creating supermajorities where one was
not intended, and increasing the leverage an individual Senator has on the
floor agenda, filibustering has affected the overall legislative process.' 99 By
holding up votes on the nominees, the filibustering senators are holding the
Senate hostage. As Senator Daschle stated "[w]e only wish they would
devote [this] kind of attention... to the matters that the American people
care most about[, such as] the fact that 3 million of them don't have jobs[,
or] that their health insurance is rising by more than 15 percent a year. 200
Essentially, Senator Daschle makes the argument that by spending so
much time talking about filibustered nominees, attention and time is taken
away from pressing national business. 201 Interestingly, Senator Daschle fails
to mention that if he and his colleagues refrained from filibustering judicial
nominees there would be no issue to waste time on in the first place.
193. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
194. Id.
195. Sarah Wilson, Appellate Judicial Appointments During the Clinton Presidency: An Inside
Perspective, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 29,41 (2003).
196. See id.
197. Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 523,525-26 (2004).
198. See Stephanie K. Seymour, The Judicial Appointment Process: How Broken Is It?, 39 TULSA
L. REv. 691, 708 (2004) (stating that "[if the Democrats keep filibustering and the President
continues to make recess appointments, the courts of appeals potentially could be left with a series of
one-year-term judges").
199. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 213-14.
200. This statement was made in response to a Republican-led, thirty-hour, all-night protest of
Democratic tactics to block four of President Bush's judicial nominees. Garrett & Wilson, supra
note 180.
201. See id.
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C. Remedies
1. If You Can't Beat Them - Sue Them
The problem with using the federal court system in trying to fix this
particular problem is that it runs into numerous procedural problems. Most
predominantly, the federal courts cannot hear political question cases or
cases where the plaintiff has no standing.
a. Standing
"In order to persuade a federal court to force the Senate to fulfill its
advice and consent responsibilities, a plaintiff would first have to
demonstrate that he or she has standing sufficient to satisfy Article III's
requirement of a case or controversy. 20 2 Thus, a potential plaintiff must be
able to demonstrate a "sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable
controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy ... 203 The
Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife developed a three part test to
evaluate the presence of a case or controversy.
First, the prospective plaintiff must demonstrate an "injury in fact"
that is concrete and particularized, as well as actual or imminent. A
generalized complaint of a citizen that the government is not
carrying out its duties is not sufficient to fulfill the injury-in-fact
requirement. Second, the plaintiff must show a causal connection
between that injury and the defendant's actions, in this case the
Senate's failure to meet its responsibilities. Finally, it must be
likely-not merely speculative-that judicial intervention would
redress the injury. 205
As such, there are several individuals who would qualify under the
Lujan standard. Most obvious would be a presidential nominee who has
been filibustered and whose name was never presented in front of the full
Senate.20 6
Another possible plaintiff would be a Senator who has been denied his
right under the constitution to exercise the power vested in him to vote on a
presidential nominee. 2 °7 Lastly, "a federal judge who is unable to carry out
202. Renzin, supra note 78, at 1774 (citing U.S. CONST. art. InI, § 2).
203. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972).
204. 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
205. Renzin, supra note 78, at 1774 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-78).
206. Id. at 1775.
207. Id.
879
his or her responsibilities adequately because of an excessive workload,
[would have] suffered injur[y] that should satisfy Lujan.'20 8
b. Political Question
The root of the political question doctrine comes from the Court's
attempt to avoid policy questions that are fundamentally areas reserved to
the legislature and, in a limited sense, the executive branch. 209 "A court
would likely be hesitant to inject itself into a battle between the Senate and
the President over an issue that, on first glance, appears to be a matter
squarely delegated to those two branches. 21°
The Court in Baker v. Carr laid out the following six-part test to
determine whether the political question doctrine applies:
1) express textual language in the Constitution committing the issue
to another branch of government; 2) an absence of standards by
which a court could resolve the issue; 3) an inability to resolve.the
issue without resorting to political policymaking; 4) the danger of
disrespecting another branch of government; 5) a strong need to
adhere to a previously made political decision; and 6) the potential
for embarrassment, caused by resolution of the issue in different
ways by different branches.2 '
Pertaining to the advice and consent clause, while the constitution does
not specifically lay out how that obligation should be performed, "a court
would be remiss in failing to find an implied obligation to carry out these
responsibilities. 2  Thus, "the Senate's systematic failure to hold a vote
would be by definition a failure to fulfill that obligation rather than simply a
choice as to how to fulfill that obligation. 213 The Court in United States v.
Ballin stated that "[tihe Constitution empowers each house to determine its
rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or
violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the
result which is sought .... 214 Therefore, the political question doctrine
should not be available to shield the filibustering of judicial nominees
because of its encroachment on coequal branches.2"5
208. Id. at 1775-76 (citations omitted).
209. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
210. Renzin, supra note 78, at 1780.
211. Id. (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
212. Id. at 1783.
213. Id. at 1783-84.
214. 144 U.S. 1,5 (1892).
215. See Renzin, supra note 78, at 1784-85.
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c. Causes of Action
Once it is established that a plaintiff has a right to address his or her
grievance in court, the question then becomes, what type of action can be
used? Despite the prevailing view that a writ of mandamus does not apply to
the Congress, it is possible it could be used to force the Senate to vote on a
particular nominee.2t 6 Unquestionably, the Court could not require the
Senate "to confirm a particular candidate; if the Senate were to vote down
every presidential nominee, there would be little that a court could do in
response. ' '217 However, that being said, if a court agrees with this article -
that the advice and consent clause was a mandate and not an option - the
writ of mandamus would be a viable option to enforce that mandate. 2, 8
Another, and more powerful, legal tool that may be implemented to
challenge the filibusters is a declaratory judgment. 2'9 Here a court would
simply hold that the Senate is in violation of the constitution.220  This is
precisely what the Court did in National Treasury Employees Union v.
Nixon,221 where a declaratory judgment was issued that the President had a
constitutional duty to comply with a federal pay increase that Congress had
passed.222 Moreover, "federal courts have demonstrated a willingness to use
declaratory judgments in reviewing legislative procedure. A federal court
could, after finding that the constitution imposes upon the Senate an
obligation to vote on nominees, declare that the Senate currently is acting in
violation of that duty. 223
216. See 13th Reg'I Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 654 F.2d 758, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The writ
of mandamus is used by the federal courts to compel a government official to act when that official
has refused to act in accordance to a clear legal obligation. See id. "[M]andamus will issue 'only
where the duty to be performed is ministerial and the obligation to act peremptory, and clearly
defined. The law must not only authorize the demanded action, but require it; the duty must be clear
and indisputable."' Id. (quoting United States ex rel. McLennan v. Wilbur, 283 U.S. 414, 420
(1931)); accord Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616 (1984) (stating that mandamus is appropriate
for a plaintiff "only if [the plaintiff] has exhausted all other avenues of relief and only if the
defendant owes [the plaintiff] a clear nondiscretionary duty").
217. See Renzin, supra note 78, at 1750.
218. See id. at 1749.
219. Id. at 1748; 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (1994) (giving federal counts power to grant declaratory
relief).
220. See Renzin, supra note 78, at 1748.
221. 492 F.2d 587 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
222. See id. (citing Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d at 587).
223. Id. at 1748-49.
2. Change the Rules
a. Increase the President's Power
One solution proffered by many, specifically Professor Eastman, has
been to increase the President's power and role in the confirmation
process.224 The first increase of power would be to pass legislation that
gives the President the ability to appoint lower court judges without the
advice and consent requirement under Article II of the constitution.225
Another suggestion for fixing the problem with an increase in
presidential power is to vest the entire appointment power in the President
alone when the Senate fails to confirm or reject a nominee within a
reasonable period of time.226 Professor Eastman argues that this approach
"would ensure that the Senate's check on Presidential power does not itself
become a blank check. '227 It is important to note that Professor Eastman is
not the only one advocating this approach; in fact, President Bush himself
proposed that the Senate Judiciary Committee hold hearings on judicial
nominees within ninety days, with a vote by the full Senate not later than
180 days after the President sends a nomination to the Senate.228
b. Keep It Simple
The simplest way to stem the filibustering would be to change the
Senate's rules to disallow it. Indeed, a group of Senators led by Senate
Majority Leader, Bill Frist, tried to do just that with the introduction of
Senate Resolution 138.229 This proposal would amend Rule XXII of the
Standing Rules of the Senate to allow a simple majority in the Senate to end
debate and hold a vote on a particular nominee.230 Presently, Rule XXII
necessitates that after a motion for cloture is filed with the President of the
Senate, 60 Senators must vote affirmatively to close the debate.23' Senate
Resolution 138 would still require sixty votes to end debate, however, each
attempt to close debate after that would decrease the necessary vote to fifty-
seven, then fifty-four, then finally to a simple majority of fifty-one.232
Accordingly, this proposal strikes an appropriate balance between
the right to debate and the need for a majority eventually to close
debate and take action on a nominee. The proposal has a strong
224. See Eastman, supra note 93, at 634-36.
225. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; Eastman, supra note 93, at 634-35.
226. See Eastman, supra note 93, at 636.
227. Id. at 636-37.
228. Id. at 636 n. 13; see also John C. Eastman, -Confirmation Logjam, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2002,
at A18 (proposing six-month timetable).
229. S. Res. 138, 108th Cong. (2003).
230. Id.
231. Walpin, supra note 4, at 98.
232. S. Res. 138, 108th Cong. (2003).
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Democratic pedigree. It originates with the filibuster reform
proposal introduced by Senators Harkin and Lieberman in 1995,
which would have applied to all filibusters, and reintroduced by
Senator Miller earlier this year. Indeed, the Harkin-Lieberman
proposal was endorsed by nineteen Senate Democrats, as well as the
New York Times, which editorialized in 1995 that "[n]ow is the
perfect moment.., to get rid of an archaic rule that frustrates
democracy and serves no useful purpose.,
233
VI. CONCLUSION
The recent flurry of filibusters against judicial nominees has set forth a
troubling precedent that invokes several constitutional concerns. The
Framers knew that the Achilles' heel in government was epitomized in Lord
Acton's saying that "[plower tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts
absolutely." 234 For this reason, they set in place the sacrosanct separation of
power doctrine. Thus, when one branch finds a loophole in that doctrine, the
country as a whole should take heed-especially our elected officials who
take an oath to protect the constitution.
As radical as it may sound, the simple act of filibustering judicial
nominees threatens not only the role of the President in the nomination
process, but also the Judiciary's independence. This political maneuver
wanes on the doctrines of presentment and bicameralism, and the very
notion of majority rule. The Senate's obligation to the advice and consent
clause has been displaced by politics and a desire to place ideology on the
checklist for employment as a federal judge. It appears that the Senate is
more concerned with nursing old grudges than with fixing the problem. As
Senator John Comyn stated:
It is time to end the blame game, fix the problem, and move on.
Wasteful and unnecessary delay in the process of selecting judges
hurts our justice system and harms all Americans. It is intolerable
no matter who occupies the White House and no matter which party
is the majority party in the Senate. Unnecessary delay has for too
long plagued the Senate's judicial confirmation process. And
filibusters are by far the most virulent form of delay imaginable.235
233. Cornyn, supra note 61, at 211.
234. Great Thinkers on Liberty, Lord Acton, Liberystory.net, available at http:I/libertystory.net/
LSTHINKACTON.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2004).
235. Cornyn, supra note 61, at 227.
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